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C HAPTER 8 
Brazil and Mexico in the 
Nonproliferation Regime 
Common Structures and Divergent 
Trajectories in Latin America 
Arturo C. Sotomayor 
T HE RE ARE M U L TI P LE 0 PT 1 ON S for Latin American countries to support 
and comply w ith the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the global level, states 
can decide to ratify the core treaties and join their supporting institutions such 
as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear \\Teapons (NPT), the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Re-
gime, the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terror-
ism, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). At the regional level, countr ies in the 
Western Hemisphere can adhere to the Treaty for the Prohibition ofNuciearWeap-
ons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 
which in 1968 created the world's first nuclear-weapons-free zone in a densely pop-
ulated region Although the treaty is fully in force and has been ratified by all Latin 
American states, regional support for the nonproliferation regime has varied sub-
stantially over time, wi th some countries chOOSing to endorse the regime early on, 
and other states historically opposing it. Empirically and theoretically, it is worth 
exploring this varia tion in nonproliferation strategies, including questioning why 
some traditionally oppoSitional states changed their position over time. 
Brazil and Mexico are regional, middle-sized powers, a category of states that 
have the ability and willingness to adopt an activist, ini tiative-oriented d iplo-
matic approach to effectively engage the international system through interna-
tional institutions and other nonmilitary means. As politically and economically 
significant states, they are able to pursue multilateral solutions and act as fa cil-
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itators in building coalitions, managers in their own regions, and promoters/ 
enforcers of international norms. L Both Brazil and Mexico share these middle 
power attributes, having both the region's largest military forces and its biggest 
economies, along with the subregional influence this grants them-Brazil in the 
southern cone of South America and Mexico in Central America. They are both 
founding members of the United Nations system and have been involved in key 
multilateral negotiations on issues ranging from the environment and peace-
keeping to disarmament.> Given these similarities, both Brazil and Mexico are 
likely cases in Latin America for internationa l primacy in the nonproliferation 
regime. However, these "','0 middle powers have historically behaved very dif-
ferently in very different international roles, implementing different foreign pol-
icies. Nowhere are these differences more evident than in the nonproliferation 
regime, where each country has followed separate paths. 
Brazil once had a clandestine, military nuclear program and expressed strong 
reservations about the nonproliferation regime, including the Treaty of T1ate-
loleo. In fact, Brazil did not remove its reservations toward Tlateloleo until 1994 
and did not sign the NPT until 1998, a latecomer to both the global and regional 
nonproliferation regimes. By contrast, Mexico promoted regional nonprolifera-
tion treaties and nuclear disarmament early in the 1960s. In fact, Mexico was 
the first Latin American country to ever sign a full safeguards agreement with 
the IAEA (in 1968), based on T1ateloleo. which predated the NPT. In due course, 
Mexico became the leading Latin American country in d isarmament circles, 
often pushing for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation measures in both 
regional and global forums. Why did these two middle powers follow such dif-
ferent nonproliferation approaches? Why did Mexico support the regime, while 
Brazil initially rejected it? Moreover, why did Brazil join the regime in the 19905, 
after decades of opposition to it? \Vhy has Mexico's support for the regime 
eroded in the past decade? 
To examine these variations of policies toward the nonproliferation regime, 
this chapter assesses several hypotheses regarding the opposition to or support 
for nonproliferation efforts, including resource constraints and economic inter-
ests, threat perceptions, and discrimination. It concludes that several of these 
structural hypotheses lack sufficient comprehensive utility to explain the diver-
gent nonproliferation strategies of Brazil and Mexico. Instead, the main argu-
ment foc uses on two main, mutually reinforcing explanatory variables: U.S. in-
fluence (systemic politics) and domestic politics. Together, they account for the 
variation in terms of support /opposition to the nonproliferation regime. Spe-
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cifically, Washington's nonproliferation policies toward Latin America alienated 
countries with advanced nuclear development programs, such as Brazil, dem-
onstrating how u.s. foreign policy plays a key role in shaping policy preferences 
in Latin America. This is consistent with structural approaches to international 
relations-such as realism-which argue that major powers have an important 
independent effect on the behavior of states in the international system, includ-
ing the structure of alliances and the balancing of coa litions, including in the de-
veloping world.' As noted realist Stephen M. Walt argues, ~weak states are also 
likely to be especially sensitive to proximate power. Where great powers have 
both global interests and global capabilities, weak states will be concerned pri-
marily with events in their immediate vicinity:" The reality is that at the inter-
national level, Latin America's security complex is largely shaped, although not 
fully determined, by the U.S. sphere of influence, which includes power, state-
craft, and a unique geography in the Western Hemisphere.' 
\Vhile hegemonic policies restrain or empower other countries to follow cer-
tain paths, they do not by themselves determine other states' policy decisions 
or outcomes. Middle powers mayor may not acquiesce to the hegemon's defi-
nit ion of security, leading to important policy variations between states with 
similar structures and capabilities, which can only be explained, then, by do-
mestic politics." In Brazil and Mexico, systemic fa ctors provide the context for 
the decision-making processes while domestic politics largely determine the 
nonproliferation policies. In particular, this chapter focuses on the relation-
ship between civil-military relations and proliferation motivations. In Brazil, 
an inward-looking domestic coalition dominated by the military (especially 
after the 1964 coup) assumed responsibility and control over nuclear issues. 
In a context dominated by Cold War politics and regional rivalry, the military 
determined Brazil's nuclear policies and then shaped preferences toward the 
nonproliferation regime. By contrast, civilian authorities in Mexico opted for 
disarmament and support for the nonproliferation regime in part to keep the 
military out of politics and away from foreign policy debates. In other words, a 
civilian-led domestic coalition committed itself to nonproliferation efforts to in-
crease the cost of m ilitary medd ling in Mexico's security affairs. ' Since military 
institutions have historically played a key political role in Latin America, it is 
important to understand how they grappled with their civilian counterparts for 
control over nuclear policy at different points in time. 
In drawing these conclusions, this chapter applies international relations the-
orist Etel Solingen's theory of domestic coalitions to a different set of domestic 
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actors, including the armed forces and their separate services." If coalitions are 
~policy networks spanning state and private political actors,» a domestic coali-
tional approach assumes that these networks have state agency, undertake proj-
ects, and affect policy, even if they are constrained by international factors.9 As 
Solingen argues, "once a certain coalition prevails politically, as a function of its 
size, cohesiveness, and effectiveness, its grand strategy becomes raison d'etat. 
Governmental policy must now reflect the essential contours of that st rategy, 
although the insti tutiona l context can impose limits on its implementation 
and even doom its viability:'" 'Vhereas Solingen focuses her attention on how 
political-economy coalitions and economic strategies ( inward versus outward 
economic policies) affect proliferation incentives, I emphasize how the armed 
forces and their political allies affect incentives to join or oppose the nonprolif-
eration regime. Solingen argues that countries with inward-looking economic 
coalitions face stronger incentives for nuclearization and are less committed to 
international overtures and nonproliferation norms. By contrast, the cases ana-
lyzed in this chapter indicate that civil-military relations shape nonproliferation 
paths, regardless of the economic constituencies and strategies in place. 
The two arguments developed in this chapter are based on t¥,'O distinct lev-
els of analysis-systemic and domestic-and can be potentially contradictory, 
especially when viewed through the requisite neorealist lens.1I Nevertheless, the 
point is not to determine which level matters most; obviously, they both do. In-
stead, what is more interesting and perhaps m ore challenging is to determine 
how the two levels matter, vary from country to country, and then interact to 
determine policy outcomes. 
Brazil and Mexico provide an ideal laboratory in which to test alternative 
explanations of why states choose to support or impede nonproliferation ef-
forts. First, as previously noted, the t¥/o Latin American countries are consid-
ered middle powers and, along with Argentina, are the only states in the re-
gion to have successfully developed nuclear power plants. Given their respect ive 
regional and middle power status, their support or opposition is relevant for 
regional and global nonproliferation initiatives. As ~nuclear threshold states-
those that have chosen nuclear restraint despite having significant nuclear capa-
bilities;' they are important ~partners for the reinvigorated drive toward global 
nuclear disarmament.»" 
Second, Brazil has modified its nuclear policy from opposition and reserva-
tion to conditional support, all while enhancing its own nuclear energy projects. 
Such diverse trajectories provide an invaluable opportunity to analyze variation 
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in nonproliferation policies. Over time, important varia tions in the dependent 
variable can be observed across the region and within states, each leading to 
multiple observations. 
Third, in Latin America, there are at least two different ways to support the 
nonproliferation regime, one via the NPT and the other via Tlateloko. While 
both treaties reinforce each other and are mutually compatible, each provides a 
different set of incentives for membership (global versus regional). Finally, a his-
torical analysis provides an ideal opportunity to use process tracing as a research 
method to identify the causal chain and mechanism of how and why states differ 
in their approach toward the regime. In that sense, this study emphasizes turn-
ing points, critical junctures, sequencing of events, and different regime trajec-
tories to identify causal relationships. 
In the following sections, I test different hypotheses about how states support 
or oppose the regime. I first analyze how technical and economic factors influ-
enced nonproliferation incentives in Brazil and Mexico. The second section ex-
amines different threat perceptions and u.s. policies, focusing on how they mil-
itate against robust nonproliferation policies. The third section analyzes how 
domestic politics and civil-military relations shaped different nonproliferation 
trajectories. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of how these historical cases 
might shed light on current nonproliferation policies in Latin America. 
HYPOTHESIS 1 : RE SOU R C E CO NSTRAINT S 
AND ECONOM I C INTERE STS 
One theory for resistance to the nonproliferation regime is that it imposes eco-
nomic and development restric tions to nonnuclear states. From this perspective, 
treaties such as the NPT ban not only the diffusion of nuclear weapons but also 
the dissemination of nuclear technology for development, even if it is for peace-
ful purposes. While the NPT does allow for the transfer of nuclear technology 
and materials for the development of civilian nuclear energy programs among 
signatory countries, in practice, however, most nuclear states have prevented 
nonnuclear weapons states from developing an indigenous mastery of nuclear 
technology for peaceful purposes by imposing a virtual embargo on suppliers 
for nuclear industries. U 
Indeed, Brazil's initia l decision not to accede to the NPT grew from its posi-
tion regarding autonomous economic development. Available studies on Latin 
America's nuclear strategies consistently demonstrate that the discourse of self-
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sufficiency and policies of desarroilismo (or autonomous development) moti-
vated the development of Brazilian and even Mexican nuclear policies since the 
1950S." The nuclear programs in Latin America were originally conceived as a 
means of acquiring energy resources from the atom. Both Brazil and Mexico 
received their initial stimulation through the Atoms for Peace Program in the 
1950s-a program conceived by the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration to as-
sist third-world countries in developing nuclear energy (mostly through techni-
cal assistance to develop research reactors). At that time, both countries had am-
bitious economic programs that were focused on developing and boosting their 
indigenous industries. As a result, the governments of both were increasingly 
pressured by multinational companies and local enterprises to supply sufficient 
energy resources to maintain a burgeoning industry. Cities like Rio de Janeiro. 
Sao Paulo. Buenos Aires, and Mexico City were heavily industrialized areas, with 
increasing levels of energy consumption. 
The need to develop nuclear energy was reinforced by the 1973 oil crisis. In 
the Brazilian case, this requirement was particularly acute. It became clear that 
the so-called Brazilian economic miracle of the 1960S and early 1970S relied on 
favorable external conditions and on cheap energy consumption." Solingen sug-
gests that the nuclear project in Brazil was motivated by its inward-looking eco-
nomic strategy, in the form of import substitution industrialization or l S I, an 
economic strategy that replaces fore ign imports with domestic production, with 
the goal of developing technology to attain self-sufficiency.'" As former minister 
of science and technology Jose Goldemberg later argued, Brazil sought an indig-
enous technological capacity, including the production of nuclear energy, which 
had been ~presented as a miraculous source of energy in the United States, Brit-
ain, France and the Soviet Union:'o 
Brazil saw the development of nuclear energy capabilities as key to overcom-
ing the country's underdevelopment. For instance, some Brazilians envisioned 
using peaceful nuclear explosives to exploit the Amazon jungle. According to 
Brazilian diplomats in the 1970S, peaceful nuclear explosives provided ~a solu-
tion to many of the serious problems which confront Latin American coun-
tries . .. such as the digging of cana ls, the connection of hydrographic basins, the 
recovery of oil fields, the release of natural gas, etc."" This, in part, explains why 
Brazil was a strong opponent of the nonproliferation regime. Although the NPT 
explicitly allows the development of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, 
in practice the nuclear weapons states considerably restricted technical and fi-
nancial assistance for such peaceful nuclear explosive devices. " Hence, Brazil 
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and its neighbor, Argentina, perceived the NPT as an impediment to their indus-
trialization and modernization. Both states also disagreed with the discrimina-
tory nature of a treaty that created two types of legal obligations: one for nuclear 
weapons states (who were not forced to immediately d isarm) and another for 
nonnuclear countries (banned from pursuing nuclear weapons). '" 
\Vhile economic reasons provided strong disincentives for Brazil to join the 
NPT, it is still unclear why Brazil had so many reservations about the regional 
nonproliferation regime, based on the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In fact, Brazil was, 
along with Mexico, one of the initial supporters of the regional nonproliferation 
regime. In 1962, Brazilian diplomats introduced a UN General Assembly resolu-
tion to discuss the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Latin America ." ln 
1963, then-president loao Gou lart signed a joint declaration of agreement with 
five other Latin American states-Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico-
to continue to commit themselves to nonproliferation in multilateral negotia-
tions. This declaration eventually led to the negotiations that created the Treaty 
of Tla telolco. 22 
The Latin American nonproliferation regime complements the NPT, but it 
does have some important differences. For instance, Tlatelolco explicitly allows 
for peaceful nuclear explosions. Article 18 reads as follows: "The Contracting 
Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes-
includ ing explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear 
weapons-or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose, provided that 
they do so in accordance with the provisions of this article and the other articles 
of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5.";]) 
Mexican diplomats introduced the article in question in order to incentivize 
Brazil and Argentina to join the emerging regional regime." ln spite of this entice-
ment, Brazil-like Argentina- signed the treaty but did not ratify or adhere to it 
until, in Brazil's case, 1994. According to Brazilian researcher Paulo S. Wrobel, Bra-
zilian military authorities, who effectively controlled the government after 19 64, 
considered Tlatelolco as a regional extension of the N P T. From Brazil's perspective, 
the tvolO treaties were developed in parallel and had apparently the same primary 
purpose: to act as a barrier to horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation." Since 
Brazil was technically opposed to the NPT, its adherence to the regional regime had 
to be consistent; hence Brasilia did not become a founding member of Tlatelolco. 
It thus appears that Brazil's reservations toward the regime were more tech-
nical and political than economic. Interestingly, Mexico followed a very similar 
autarkic economic strategy as Brazil. Like Brazil in the 19 30S and 1940S, post-
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war governments in Mexico embarked on import substitution industrialization 
policies with considerable state involvement in the economy. In fact, it was the 
Mexican Revolution of 1910-20 and its aftermath that created a political regime 
with a corporatist system and strong nationalist, developmentalist, and popu-
list orientations. The regime was authoritar ian in nature and based on a sys-
tem of single-party rule, sustained by a coalition dominated by unions, peasants, 
and national entrepreneurs. The regime survived through tariffs, quantitative 
restrictions to imports, and foreign direct investment, as well as nat ionalization 
of key sectors (including the oil sector). This ushered in a period of stabiliza-
tion and growth, which lasted until the late 1970S, when the Mexican economy 
reached an impasse as a resu lt of its macroeconomic policies. '"' 
In spite of the limitations and goa ls of its economic strategy, Mexico was able 
to develop its own nuclear program while fully joining the NPT regime and lead-
ing regional nonproliferation efforts. Although less advanced and perhaps less 
ambitious than Brazil's nuclear capability, the Laguna Verde nuclear plant began 
operations in 1986, after almost four decades of nuclear research. This was only 
a year after Brazil opened its first nuclear plant in 1985, known as Angra 1. 'Vhile 
many Mexican nuclear scientists received training in the United States, the IAEA 
provided the bulk of the technical and financial assistance to develop Mexico's 
nuclear capability. Surprisingly, Mexico did not develop any bilateral nu clea r 
research agreements with Washington or any other country during the initial 
stage of the construction of Laguna Verde. As Universi ty of Virginia scholar 
John R. Redick discovered in a pioneer study of Latin America's nuclear pro-
grams, ~a desire to be independent with respect to its own power supply is also 
noted by Mexican officials themselves as an important rationa le for opting for 
nuclear power:'''' 
The economic and technological restrictions imposed by the NPT certainly 
did not impede Mexican leaders from developing a peaceful nuclear capability. 
Moreover, Brazil and Mexico shared very similar economic patterns throughout 
the 1970S and 1980s, followed by economic growth, recession, foreign debt, and 
economic crisis. Hence, economic reasons are neither necessary nor sufficient 
conditions for non-accession to the regime. 
HYP OTHES I S 2: T H REAT CON DITIONS AND U. s. HEGEMONY 
A second line of argument considers that differential threat perceptions militate 
against robust nonproliferation policies. Many states see nuclear proliferation as 
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a "U.S. problem," the priority of which falls far behind the multiple security re-
gional threats they face, none of which are addressed by the nonproliferation re-
gime. Other states are reluctant to join these efforts, discomforted by the notion 
of taking political direction from Washington. In the Latin American context, 
the U.S. role had larger consequences on nonproliferation decisions than did dif-
ferential threat perceptions. 
Compared to other parts of the globe, Latin America has been relatively 
peaceful and exempt from external security tnreats. A large number of the mil-
itarized, territorial disputes in the region have rarely escalated into interstate 
war. '" Instead, when crises have appeared to escalate, Latin American states tend 
to rely on a diplomatic culture that is normative and principled in its approach. 
This has resulted in a collective understanding that favors legal obligations 
among regional neighbors, based on the expectation and practice that countries 
from the Americas almost always engage in pacific settlement wnen a conflict 
emerges."" Given this relatively peaceful environment, realist explanations might 
suggest that nuclear proliferation would be a non-issue in Latin America. As one 
regional political observer points out, the negotiation of a nuclear-weapon-free 
zone in Latin America was relatively easy because it was a region that was al-
ready denuclearized. '" In other words, Latin America appears to be an "easy 
case" for nonproliferation, given its nonnuclear status and the absence of ma-
lign external threats. 
That at least two Sou tn American states- including Argentina and Brazil-
pursued military-led nuclear programs in a relatively benign threat environment 
is therefore puzzling. The southern-most area of South America, often referred 
to as the Southern Cone, was not a contested region in contemporary interna-
tional politics. \Vnile there were indeed sources of instabil ity, these threats es-
sentially arose from conflicts within state borders." As Goldemberg explains, 
~Unlike Israel or India, Brazil has no political problems with its neighbors that 
might lead the military to seek nuclear weapons on security grounds."" 
Most Latin American specialists agree that Brazil's nuclear aspirations were 
driven by its nuclear rivalry with Argentina, thus confirm ing realist arguments 
that competitive international environments motivate arms races and rivalries." 
The Argentine-Brazilian rivalry was, for most of the nineteenth and I\ventieth 
centuries, a perennial feature of international relations in the Southern Hemi-
sphere; their nuclear race became a subset of their larger competition for influ-
ence in the region. From a rea list perspective, the nuclear competition bel\veen 
both countries was m otivated by a desire to achieve military primacy, which 
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wou ld in turn allow them to exercise regional predominance. This led nuclear 
proliferation experts in the 1970S and 1980s to consider Argentina and Brazil as 
nuclear threshold states (Le., states with the capacity to build nuclear weapons). 
However, as American diplomat Mitchell Reiss points out, Argentina and 
Brazil were more likely to constrain their nuclear capabilities because the two 
countries were "riva ls, but not enemies.nJ~ Theoretically speaking, this condi-
tion wou ld have allowed for compliance with the regional nonproliferation re-
gime. Argentina and Brazil indeed have an enviably limited record of going to 
war with each other. The last time Argentina fought against Brazil was 1825-28, 
during the Cisplatine War in the Banda Oriental area of present-day Uruguay. 
Regional threats since have not been so intense as to prompt spiraling arms races 
that would lead to a full rejection of the nonproliferation regime. Yet, in spite of a 
relatively benign threat scenario, Brazil remained opposed to the NPT and failed 
to adhere to the Tlateloko Treaty for almost thirty years. Ironically, during this 
time, it never overtly argued that its external security environment impeded its 
full accession to the regime. 
Brazil did, however, express concern about us. policies and intentions, sig-
naling the power of US. policies to shape regional proliferation preferences. His-
torically, the United States has reacted differently to insecurity in the region, 
sometimes failing to intervene in regional conflicts and other times interven-
ing with military force. As Oxford University professor Andrew Hurrell argues, 
"it has always been difficult to define Latin America's security complex in a way 
that excludes the United States .... The US. role in the security of the hemi-
sphere provides the perfect iUustration of the old adage that intervention and 
non-intervention are t\vo sides of the same coin."" 
In particular, two events affected hemispheric perceptions of the United 
States and shifted policies regarding nonproliferation in Latin America. First, 
prompted by India's 1974 nuclear test, Washington reviewed its nuclear policy 
regarding the transfer of sensitive nuclear material to developing countries, 
eventually passing the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which imposed 
full-scope safeguards on all nuclear transfers. This contributed to a virtual em-
bargo on suppliers for Brazilian and Argentine nuclear industries, irritating both 
countries in the Southern Cone and engendering suspicion in Brazil toward the 
United States. 
The new restrictions imposed by the US. government specifically targeted 
and affected Brazil In 1975, Brazil signed a nuclear agreement with \Vest Ger-
many, which would have allowed the former 10 explore and enrich uranium, re-
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process spent fuel, and build eight nuclear plants. But \Vashington reacted nega-
tively to such a nuclear deal and eventually persuaded 'Vest Germany to require 
full nuclear safeguards from Brazil. '" The military then realized that belonging 
to the Western bloc did not imply integration with the developed world." This 
policy strengthened Brazil's opposition to the global regime based on its dis-
criminatory nature and reinforced its official position for non-accession to the 
treaty. 
A second determinant event was the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas 'Var. In more 
than one sense, the Malvinas crisis brought dissent to the Southern Cone, be-
cause it illustrated the symbolic irrelevance of the Inter-American Defense sys-
tem, a poorly integrated collection of countries, instruments, organizations, and 
norms, including, inter alia, the Organization of American States, which proved 
completely unable to deal with the contlict. Furthermore, the dispute repre-
sented a real threat to most countries in the Southern Cone, since it was believed 
that British ships carried nuclear weapons into Argentine territorial waters, a 
clear violation of Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which specified that nu-
clear weapons states would not transfer explosive nuclear devices to the region 
and would not threa ten to use them against the members of the treaty. (It should 
be noted, however, that while the United Kingdom had ratified the protocol, it 
did not apply to Argentina, which had not ratified the treaty.) In any case, this 
event also convinced Brazilian experts and military leaders that the Tlatelolco 
regime was, in effect, irrelevant for nuclear crises, reinforcing their reservations 
toward regional nonproliferation efforts. 
Curiously enough, one of the most important effects of the Falklands/Malvinas 
war was that U.S. policies eventually freed the military establishments of Argen-
tina and Brazil to forge closer links among themselves; Brazil recognized Ar-
gentina's sovereignty of the Falklands, and ultimately the two signed an agree-
ment on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, marking the beginning of the 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear entente.'" Their similar nuclear and military poli-
cies included a mutual opposition toward the global and regional nonprolifera-
tion regimes. \\Tashington's policies gave Brazil and Argentina a common cause 
to oppose the regime itself. In this way, hegemonic policies affected regional al-
liances and provided incentives for opposi tion to the regime. 
In clear contrast to Brazil, Mexico was the Latin American state most vul-
nerable to a potential nuclear threat, precisely due to its proximity to the United 
Sta tes. It has been widely acknowledged that the impact of the 1962 Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis made Mexico acutely aware of the risks of a nuclear war. Not only did 
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the crisis take place in the vicinity of Mexico-and with a Mexican ally, the rev-
olutionary regime of Cuba-but it also attracted the East-\Vest confrontation to 
the hemisphere. Historica l records of that period show that Mexican decision 
makers were shocked to learn that Fidel Castro had invited Soviet missiles into 
Cuban territory, especially after the Mexican regime (led by the Revolutionary 
Institu tional Party) had invested diplomatic energy and resources in defending 
Cuba at the OAS, where it had been previously suspended." Some scholars argue 
that the 1962 crisis generated widespread inhibition on the use of nuclear weap-
ons, provided strong incentives to avoid a nuclear war, and gave rise to the pro-
hibi tionary norm of nuclear taboo, an underwritten understanding that nuclear 
weapons should not be used, especially against nonnuclear states:'" 
The counterargument is equally valid; the fear of annihilation could well have 
triggered a predisposition toward the bomb and a natural rejection toward the 
regime. Indeed, as a result of the crisis, Mexico discovered that it, too, was a di-
rect ta rget of Soviet deterrence. Soviet strategists were determined to block all 
economic and raw material assistance to the United States in case of a nuclear 
war, thus Mexican border cities and major urban metropolises (including Mex-
ico City) were specifically targeted." From a strictly security perspective, Mex-
ico should have either developed its own nuclear capabili ty to deter a Soviet 
attack or negotiated a set of explicit nuclear guarantees with its powerful neigh-
bor. Canada followed this latter path, for example, under the nuclear umbrella 
offered via NATO. Mexico took neither of these tv.'o steps. Instead, it denounced 
the nuclear arms race and embarked on the seemingly impossible: nuclear dis-
armament and nonproliferation. Mexico-along with Chile, Costa Rica, Bolivia, 
and Brazil-first proposed a regional nonproliferation regime in the aftermath 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis. A series of regional negotiations and diplomatic 
meetings took place in Mexico City from 1964 to 1967, at the headquarters of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the neighborhood of Tlatelolco. After the treaty 
was opened for signature in February 1967, by 1968 Mexico was the only Latin 
American country to ratify it; the rest- including Brazil- changed their nuclear 
positions or opted not to adhere to it. 
But if Mexico was the most vulnerable Latin American state to a potential 
Soviet nuclear attack during the Cold War era because of its proximity to the 
United Sta tes, why did it support nonproliferation efforts? Why not request ex-
plici t nuclear guarantees from its northern neighbor? Why did it denounce U.S. 
nuclear strategies and then call for disarmament? If anything, Washington's nu-
clear policies constituted an implicit nuclear umbrella for Mexico. At best, the 
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international system and u.s. influence provide the context under which policy 
decisions for and against the nonproliferation regime emerge, but they alone 
cannot account for policy variations between Latin America's middle powers. 
HYPOTHESIS ,,: C IVIL- MI LITARY RELATIONS 
AND DOMESTIC POLITICS MOTIVATIONS 
Leaving aside the reason(s) why states pursue nuclear weapons, the decision to 
support the nonproliferation regime (or not) can sometimes be influenced by 
the decision to acquire the nuclear bomb (or not). In particular, the develop-
ment of nuclear power production in Latin America has often been linked to 
military politics-not only because most Latin American countries have experi-
enced previous military and authoritarian regimes, but because military poten-
tia l of civil nuclear power has been evident in at least two of the three countries 
where nuclear energy has been successfully produced, namely, Argentina and 
Brazil. Consequently, it is important to assess the military's support or opposi-
tion to the regime. 
Historically, the influence of the military in nuclear matters in Brazil has been 
especially strong. The country experienced a critical juncture in 1964, when a 
coup ousted President Goulart and replaced him with a dic ta torial military re-
gime. This major political event modified Brazil's support for the emerging re-
gional nonproliferation regime as the military assumed a direct role in politics 
and economic development. Consequently, the changing nature of civil-military 
relations affected nuclear incentives. The dictatorship assumed a technical ap-
proach to Brazilian problems, supporting a new coalition of apolitical techno-
crats that favored industr ialization and modernization. It is this new political 
coali tion, led by the military, that reassessed nuclear issues, emphasizing the use 
of nuclear development ~to meet Brazilian energy needs and its potential to ful-
fill national security requirements."" As Columbia University professor Alfred 
Stepan describes, the geopolitical thinking of Brazil's armed forces developed a 
close interrelationship between security and national development, which con-
tributed to the military's ali-encompassing managerialism over the domestic 
political system. In Brazil, this form of military thinking was branded the new 
~national securi ty policy:" The armed forces believed that, in comparison to ci-
vilians, they knew better and had the ~correct" doctrines of national security and 
development:' Nuclear policy was no exception; Brazil's nuclear energy policy 
was planned and controlled by the National Commission on Nuclear Energy, 
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then a subordinate of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, all under military tute-
lage from 1964 to 1984. 
Indeed, the dictatorship modified and adjusted Brazil's policy toward Tla· 
telolco and the NPT. According to Paulo S. 'Vrobel, Brazil had once been South 
America's champion of regional denuclearization efforts, but after the 1964 coup 
the new foreign policy prioritized the concept of national security. In practical 
terms, this meant that international treaties, such as Tlatelolco. had to be redone 
or questioned. Brazil thus became uninterested in international negotiations for 
nuclear disarmament and expressed strong reservations against the regional and 
global nonproliferation regimes, which included technical issues (dealing mostly 
with restrictions to peaceful nuclear explosions), legal considerations (such as 
when Tlatelolco would enter into force in Brazil), and political matters (focused 
most notably on the discriminatory nature ofthe NPT)." 
In addition to developing nuclear energy, the military engaged in a paral-
lel nuclear program, known as the Autonomous Program of Nuclear Tech-
nology (PATN), which sought to develop uranium enrichment technologies. 
Three branches of the military were involved: ~Both the Navy and Air Force 
efforts were oriented toward specific military applications that fit with tradi-
tional mission orientations; the Navy sought to ensure a reliable source of fuel 
for nuclear-propelled submarines, while the Air Force aimed to develop a use-
ful power supply for satellites."" The army was tasked with the development of 
a graphite reactor that would rely primarily on plutonium. Although there were 
many technical delays and each military branch faced considerable scientific ob· 
stacles, Brazil mastered the enrichment process by 1981. Of the three branches 
involved, the navy was the most successful in mastering enrichment technol-
ogy."" The armed forces were also involved in bUilding centrifuges to enrich 
uranium in an experimental center near Sao Paulo. Nuclear safeguards did not 
cover this program, which was clandestine and unknown to dvilian authorities. 
This in par t suggests that Brazil's military services were not primarily fo-
cused on the development of nuclear weapons per se, but rather sought to have 
a ~nuclear option" for nonweapon military applications, such as nuclear subma-
rines and satellites:" Nonetheless, the armed forces established a secret project 
to design weapons and test devices. The Solimoes Project was the code name 
for this secret program that included nuclear weapons design and excavation 
of a thousand-foot-deep shaft at a military base near Cachimbo. in the Amazon 
jungle, to carry out nuclear testing. <II The activities conducted at the base were 
secret until the Brazilian Nationa l Congress summoned Brazil's intelligence and 
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military officials to explain the spending of millions of dollars on secret atomic 
research. Senior mil itary officials who testified in Congress repeatedly denied 
knowing of the existence of the nuclear weapons program. However, the report 
conducted by a bicameral legislative commission, which was made public a few 
weeks after President Fernando Collor de Mello took office in December 1990, 
revealed that the nation's former military rulers intended to build an atomic 
bomb. Indeed, according to Pedro Pau lo Leoni Ramos, Collor de Mello's minis-
te r for strategic affai rs, who testified in the bicameral commission: 
everything was handled in extreme secrecy, making it difficu lt to rescue docu -
ments; but at a his torical moment, the project was conceived wi thin the Pre ~i ­
dmcy of the Republic to enhance various autonomous programs for the devel-
opment of nuclear technology. Someone or some people decided to empower 
these installations . . . to conceive the development of an artifact. Therefore, 
the development of an arti fact would need to complete three phases: the very 
existence of fi ssile materia l, mgineering design and fi eld test ing .... 
Jose Goldemberg. who also testified as a member of the de Mello administra-
tion in his role as minister of science and technology, publicly declared to legis-
lators that "as a result of secrecy and lack of control, clandestine activities were 
developed within the government, leading to the plans to build nuclear weap-
ons.n", The findings of the bicameral commission concluded with the fo lloWing 
statements: 
The testimonies of your distinguished excellences Jose Goldemberg, Minister 
of Science and Technology, and Pau lo Leoni Ramos, Minister of Strategic Af-
fa irs of the Presidency of the Republic, were exhaustive in adm itt ing that "at 
a historic momentn there was the decision, taken inside the Palace of Plan-
alto, to build a nuclear device. The drillings performed in Cachimbo would 
be the proving ground of these artifacts. Brazil's civil society was completely 
marginalized throughout this process; it was not consulted or heard, nor was 
Congress inform ed of the Nuclear Program. Therefore, it is imperative that 
Congress provides the legal tools necessary to moni tor nuclear ac tivity in the 
cou nt ry. ~ 
The nonproliferation regime was perceived by the armed forces as onerous and 
intrusive for their military ambitions, demonstrating that Brazil's initial refusal 
to join the nonproliferation regime(s) was not solely based on economic or tech-
nical grounds, but on military and political motivations. Neither the NPT nor 
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the Tlatelolco treaty would have permitted the junta to develop such expertise, 
since the regime restrained militarized activities. The military instead opted to 
create, ~wi th C NEN'S [National Nuclear Energy Commission's) support .. . a 
clandestine program that was designed to produce highly enriched uranium or 
weapons- grade plutonium outside of IAEA safeguards."" Brazil's junta was com-
mitted to a militarized nuclear project and covertly sought the nuclear option. 
The evolVing nature of civil-military relations in Brazil explains why the 
country modified its opposition toward the regime. In fact, the democratization 
process that began in 1985 provided strong incentives to demil itarize Brazil's 
nuclear project. The leading figure in Brazil's decision to join the nonprolifera-
tion regime was President Collor de Mello, who assumed the preSidency in 1990 
(the first democratically elected preSident after 1964). A political outsider with 
an entrepreneurial background, Collor de Mello won the presidential election 
wi th only a slim 53 percent runoff majority against Luis Inacio da Silva (Lula)." 
The military perceived Collor with skepticism. In fact, the armed forces (along 
wi th conservative opposition members of Congress) were Collor's foremost in-
stitutional opponent. As Etel Solingen explains, Collor ~slashed m ilitary budgets 
from 6 percent in 1989 to 2.2 in 1990, denied salary raises to 320,000 military 
personnel, and purged officers from important bureaucra tic positions."" As a re-
sul t, the preSidency of Coli or de Mello soon came under cr iticism from the mili-
tary institution and from civilians who supported the armed forces. 
Collor fa ced a nuclear establishment run by those in the military who still 
hoped to build a Brazilian bomb. A cabinet member of the Collor administra-
tion declared that the Brazilians ~could in principle enrich uranium to very high 
levels and produce weapons-grade material. . .. That is why we are so concerned 
about putting government controls in place now:" " Therefore, Collor de Mel-
lo's statements ru ling out nuclear explosions were not enough; the preSident re-
qU ired other mechanisms to remove the control of nuclear programs from mili-
tary hands. 
It is in this context that nonproliferation became appealing to Brazil The pro-
cess began on November 28, 1990, when Presidents Carlos Saul Menem of Ar-
gentina and Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil met at the 19uacu Fall!>, which 
forms a common border between the t\\'o countries. There they signed an inter-
national agreement whereby they renounced the development of nuclear weap-
ons and set forth a number of institutiona l mechanisms to assure one another 
that their nuclear establishments would live up to their international commit-
ment. A safeguard agreement was negotiated under IAEA auspices. In 1991, the 
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two presidents met again in Mexico, where they signed the Guadalajara Accord 
for the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes, which laid the basis for the 
creation of the first bilateral institution, namely, the Argentine-Brazilian Agency 
for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). ABACC is currently 
composed of four members, which include the presidents of the respective nu-
clear energy commissions and two high representatives from the respective min-
istries of foreign affairs, plus a secretariat based in Rio de Janeiro, the secretary 
of which alternates yearly between a Brazilian national and an Argentine. Under 
ABACC, Argentina and Brazil are to submit to the bilateral agency a complete in-
ventory of their nuclear materials, as well as thorough descriptions of their nu-
clear facilities. ABACC'S main task is to verify, via in situ inspections, that the in-
formation provided by both governments is accurate. '" Ultimately, this process 
formalized the accession of both Argentina and Brazil to the NPT and Tlatelolco. 
Brazil first acceded to the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1994 and then, under the adminis-
tration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, became a full member of the 
NPT in 1998. 
Brazil's sudden accession to the nonproliferation regime helped ensure civil-
ian control over nuclear programs. The creation of a bilateral institution, under 
1AEA auspices, promised that Brazilian nuclear policies would be subject to in-
ternational scrutiny, therefore rendering it the responsibility of diplomats and 
other civilian decision makers, rather than the armed forces. Such a policy could 
not have been implemented unilaterally, prompting Brazilian civilian leaders to 
seek international participation in the nonproliferation regime, in order to gain 
leverage over the militaries that they sorely distrust." 
Through this diplomatic maneuvering. nuclear policy was de facto trans-
ferred to the diplomatic establishment, led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
known as Itamaraty, a new civilian-led coalition. In the Brazilian case, Itamara-
ty's main role "was to soften the nationalistic stances defended by the Brazilian 
military.»'" This also granted the president the "power of appointment"; that is, 
the president could appoint civilians to key positions related to nuclear policy. 
This gave inspiration to what Ambassador Julio Cesar Carasales has branded as 
~presidential diplomacy," whereby foreign policy reflects the interests and mo-
tivations of the executive. '" In so doing. the president could remove the mili-
taries from the decision making. For instance, Collor de Mello appointed Jose 
Goldemberg as his minister of science and technology. placing him in charge of 
the Nuclear Energy Commission. Goldemberg. a former president of the Brazil-
ian Physics Society and of the Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science, was a 
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leading critic of the program's secrecy and military control. It was Goldemberg 
who proposed the designing of a civilian-administered control system, draw-
ing on technical assistance from the IAIiA. In Goldemberg's view, ~Empowered 
to conduct regular and random visi ts, Brazilian and Argentine teams would be 
composed of independent, civilian scientists approved by the Brazilian Senate.""" 
Brazil's full accession to the nonproliferation regime facilitated democratiza-
tion by increasing civilian leverage over the military-led coalition. The election 
of Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the presidency in 1994 furth er modified the 
balance ben .. 'een civilians and the military. In 1996, Cardoso published Brazil's 
first National Defense Policy and in 2000 he was finally able to establish an inte-
grated, civilian-led Ministry of Defense.·' 1t is in this political context of demo-
cratic consolidation that Brazil joined the C TBT and N PT in 1998, and finally par-
ticipated in a NPT Review Conference in 2000, as a nonnuclear weapons state. 
Still, the path toward military reform was not without obstacles, since the mili-
tary bargained for reserved domains in exchange for their return to the barracks, 
and some commanders opposed such measures altogether. Nevertheless, the ac-
cession of Brazil to the nonproliferation regime facilitated some level of normal-
ization in civil-mili ta ry re lations and contributed to an expanded civilian-led for-
eign policy agenda."' But as is analyzed in the next sect ion, mili tary remnants 
from the dicta torial era persist in Brazil's nonproliferation strategy. 
Therefore. the international nonproliferation regime became an extension of 
Brazilian domestic politics, in which national leaders benefited from the ability 
to tie their hands by creating an international commitment that increased the 
cost of reversing to previous military policies.OJ Transferring the policymaking 
process to the international level also mobilized those coalitions who had the 
most to gain from the norms implicit in the nonproliferation regime, such as 
diplomats, civilian scientists, and environmentalists." In that sense, Brazil re-
sembles other democratizing and liberalizing sta tes that joined the regime in the 
early 1990s, including Argentina and South Africa. For these states, domestic 
considerations and civil-military relations provided strong incentives to reverse 
their opposition toward the regime. 
If domestic politics plays such an important role in ensuring adherence to 
the nonproliferation regime. what domestic motivations inspired Mexico to join 
the regime so early in the 1960s? 'Vhy did Mexico become a leading advocate 
of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in Latin America? If Brazil's cri ti -
cal juncture was the 1964 military coup, Mexicds critical juncture was the 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis. As argued above, the crisis not only prompted a foreign 
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policy dilemma with Cuba, but it also triggered a nationa l security debate about 
how to react to the nearby Soviet missiles. One option included a military re-
sponse, but only at the expense of inviting the armed forces to contribute to the 
Mexican decision-making process. This would have entailed either an agree-
ment with the United States to obtain an explicit nuclear umbrella, a request to 
deploy U.S. missiles on Mexican territory to protect the country against an at-
tack from Moscow, or the development of military nuclear capabilities. These 
options, however, represented too much for a political regime that had based its 
stability on the exclusion of the armed forces from the single-party system. In-
deed, Mexico had been able to guarantee civilian ru le and stable civil-mili tary 
relations by co-opting the military's political behavior, in exchange for which 
the armed forces were given the autonomy to decide upon promotions, doctrine, 
strategy. and military operations. This eventually guaranteed a depoliticized mil-
itary that was servant to the party.M The option of securitizing and militarizing 
nuclear issues in Mexico was thus ruled out because it was deemed to be danger-
ous for the internal stability of the political regime. Mexican rulers at the time 
were adamant about involving the military in political issues, in part because 
they wanted to avert an insubordination of the kind experienced in South Amer-
ica, in countries such as Brazil. The fear of excessive military influence prompted 
the early demilitarization of Mexican politics. 
Consequently. an alternative plan had to be devised to deal with the con-
sequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In u'S.-Soviet relations, this translated 
into the detente; in Mexico, the path followed was an indisputable resolution in 
favor of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In 1963. Adolfo Lopez Ma-
teos (Mexico's first civilian president in the postrevolutionary era) instruc ted 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Manuel Tello and his representative to Brazil, Al-
fonso Garcia Robles (who would later win the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize for the 
Tlatelolco Treaty), to immediately embark on multilateral negotiations to ban 
nuclear weapons in Latin American territories."" The decision to rely on diplo-
macy instead of traditional security and mili ta ry policies was clearly strategic 
and motivated by domestic politics. Denuclearization provided an opportunity 
to de-secure nuclear issues by making them a feature of diplomatic and multilat-
eral negotiations. Hence, for Mexico, nuclear proliferation became a legal issue 
instead of a military affair, whereby treaties, norms, and rules were political tools 
with which to constrain proliferation options. In making this choice, Mexican 
presidents delegated a sensitive security issue to its diplomatic corps, enabling 
civilians to insulate the military establishment from the temptations of nuclear-
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ization, while maintaining civilian supremacy and political stability in a regime 
that was all but democratic. This, again, reinforces the argument that transfer-
ring authority to an international regime helps diffuse certain domestic coali-
tions, while it mobilizes others who might share the international norms implici t 
in the regime or those who have a stake in global trends. 
The policy embraced by Mexico was not only less costly than the alternative; 
it also allowed the country to maintain full civilian control of its own nuclear 
program, while averting any suspicion of its intentions and ambitions. Paradox-
ically, the move satisfied all parties involved. First, participation in arms control 
agreements offered Mexico a forum in which the country was free of conflict 
with the United States. \Vashington had expressed interest in and support for 
regional denuclearization efforts because they explicitly prohibited Soviet mis-
siles in Latin American territory, averting a future nuclear crisis in the region. 
This reinforces the argument that a propitious international context and support 
from the United States can affect incentives among middle powers. Second, the 
leftist movement in Mexico was equally sat isfied. Labor unions, the Communist 
Party, and intellectuals had developed strong ties with Cuba, but Mexicds stand 
on nuclear issues appeared politically neutral and even anti-American. In sum, 
the support for nonproliferation appeased the military, satisfied the left, and mo-
bilized the diplomatic establishment, while portraying an internationa l image 
for Mexico that was neither pro-American nor pro-Soviet. 
In due course, Mexico became Latin America's norm entrepreneur in nonpro-
liferation forums. Its position in favor of disarmament and nudear-weapon-free 
zones during the Cold War era became institutionalized and embedded in Mexican 
diplomacy. Once this stand was taken and assumed, Mexicds support for nonpro-
liferation became "sacred:' nearly subject to path dependence, in the sense that it 
was almost impossible to reverse th is path. Diplomats in Mexico would often refer 
to their nonproliferation policies as part of a legacy, which they branded as the Gar-
cia Robles doctrine, in re ference to the founding father of the Tlatelolco regime. 
LE S SONS FROM THE PAST, PRESENT POLICIES, 
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Given the relevance of both U.S. foreign policy and civil-military rela tions in 
Latin America, what should we expect from the region in terms of support or 
opposition toward the nonproliferation regime today? A number of lessons can 
be drawn from this historical and comparative case study. 
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First, policies, actions, and rhetoric from nuclear states can often have unin-
tended consequences in the Western Hemisphere. During the Cold \Var era, u.s. 
nuclear denial policies generated negative incentives for potentia l proliferators, 
such as Brazil, to join international regimes like the NPT. To date, Washington ap-
pears to be making similar mistakes as it once again provides sticks and carrots to 
different states with varying nuclear ambitions. In particular, the 2008 nuclear deal 
with India now allows the United States to sell nuclear fuel, technology, and reactors 
to New Delhi for peaceful energy, despite the fact that India tested nuclear bombs in 
1974 and 1998 and never signed the NPT.07 Other states will have learned the lessons 
from this nuclear agreement either through emulation or by socialization And no 
other state in Latin America is as interested in the Indian case as Brazil 
Like India, Brazil feels entitled to international status and recognition. The 
u.s. endorsement of New Delhi's nuclear program and its support for a perma-
nent seat in the UN Securi ty Council provides strong incentives for Brazil to fol-
low the Indian path."" This could lead Brazilian leaders to reverse, reconsider, or 
condition their country's nonnuclear status. As Brazilian scholar Diego Santos 
Vieira de Jesus reminds us, Brazil is using nuclear policy to promote its new role 
as an "emerging power" by developing close relations with other southern and 
nuclear partners, including India and China."" Hence, U.S. nonproliferation pol-
icies in India may have established a wrong precedent, since other countries will 
demand similar concessions to those granted to the South Asian nuclear power. 
Second, while Brazil has joined the NPT and Tlatelolco regimes, and even 
founded its own regional inspection mechanism (ABAee ), its commitment to 
the nonproliferation regime remains ambiva lent. Brazil needs nuclear energy 
to dea l with its own energy shortages. Blackouts caused by low rainfall and 
droughts in 2000 and 2001 increased the domestic demand for civilian nuclear 
power programs.'" Yet, in 2004, Brasilia denied the IAEA permission to carry out 
inspections in its uranium enrichment plant in Resende, near Rio de Janeiro. A 
confidential agreement signed between Brazil and the IAEA increased the agen-
cy's access to the nuclear plant but was short of unrestricted inspections. Brazil 
temporarily suspended Resende's official start date in 2006 in an effort to avoid 
comparisons wi th iran, which had also restricted inspections to its nuclear fa-
cilities.71 Still, Brazil continued to resist efforts to increase the IAEA'S inspections 
mandate via the Additional Protocol to the NPT. 
In fact, Argentina and Brazil closed ranks again and requested a joint excep-
tion to the Additional Protocol. They argued that AIlAce exempted them from 
making additional arrangements with the IAE A. For Buenos Aires and Brasilia, 
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ADACC had already reached an agreement with the [AliA in 1997. giving inspec-
tors access to any part of the country and ensuring the absence of nondeclared 
nuclear materials and activities." Brazil has refused to sign the [AliA'S Additional 
Protocol. mainly because it perceives the system as intru sive and jeopardizing 
its ability to develop an independent and indigenous centrifuge technology." 
Luis Pinguelli Rosa, head of Electrobras, the national electric company. declared 
that ~there are no conceptual secrets .... But there are advanced technological 
solutions, such as equipment, setup and mater ia ls, that Brazil has the right to 
guard."" In 2010, Samuel Pinheiro Gimaraes, Brazil's former minister of strate-
gic affairs under the Lula administration, denounced the Additional Protocol for 
allowing nuclear weapon states to have free access to the most sensitive nuclear 
technologies of developing states. In his view, the protocol's gUidelines on nu-
clear technology could promote industrial espionage." 
Critics of the Argentine-Brazilian exception, such as Carnegie analyst Mark 
Hibbs, correctly point out that the Additional Protocol and the ADACC are in-
tended to build confidence that nuclear activities are peaceful, but they are not 
the same. As Hibbs argues: 
The form er is a legal document setting forth inspect ion rights and the la tter is 
an institution. The Addi tional Protocol provides the [A EA specific rights to ac-
cess a wealth of information tha t is outside the purview of standard NP T safe-
guards agreements, especially concerning undeclared ac tivities. The agree-
ment between the [AEA and ABACC, on the o ther hand, is sim ilar to standard 
NPT safeguards agreements and does not give the [AEA rights specified by the 
Addit ional Protocol.'~ 
Furthermore, the ADACC cannot move unless the governments of Argentina and 
Brazil, which effectively control it, move forward; so it has less political inde-
pendence to autonomously assess information provided by the governments. 
The exception clause given to Argentina and Brazil also raises the possibility 
that other countries with access to sensitive nuclear materia l will request ex-
ceptiona l treatment, thus undermining the multilateral nonproliferation regime. 
Ironically, the ADACC concession created a similar condition to the one that Bra-
zil had criticized for decades before joining the NPT, namely, a regime based on 
discrimination and exceptions with two different types of legal obligations, one 
for ADACC members and another for non-ADAce states. 
If Brazil pursues civil ian and peacefu l interests, then why is it so hesi-
tant to allow nuclear inspectors under the [AliA Add itional Protocol? Again. 
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civil-military relations offer an answer to this puzzle. While the nuclear plant is 
for commercia l use, designed to enrich uranium to 3-5-5 percent, the navy devel-
oped its technology. Military interests are thus still very much vested in Brazil's 
nuclear program. The resistance to open the Resende plant for inspection is in 
direct response to the military's continuous involvement in nuclear policy. The 
Brazilian Navy had always wanted to develop a nuclear-powered submarine, for 
which uranium would have to be enriched to 20 percent. To date, civilian lead-
ers appear to have conceded to this demand. In 2008, President Lula's National 
Defense Strategy called for the mastery of the complete nuclear fuel cycle and for 
the building of nuclear-powered submarines. The Brazilian goverrun ent has des-
ignated its production facilities for nuclear submarine construct ion as restricted 
military areas, thus denying IA IiA inspectors access to such facilities. Military 
politics thu s continue to shape Brazil's nuclear project." Moreover, according to 
Hibbs, if Brazil were to join the IAIi A Additional Protocol, it wou ld be obliged 
to render additional information about its nuclear parallel project and ~disclose 
to the IA IiA any high- level radioactive waste inventories, which would testify to 
historical production of undeclared nuclear material processing in the country:" 
Furthermore, there is strong suspicion that the technology used by the navy 
to build the nuclear plant was based on the design by the European enrichment 
consortium URIiNCO, which would, as it has been pointed out, ~undermine Bra-
zil's claim to indigenous development of the centrifuges, as well as (lead tol 
questions about how the design was acquired.""" From a civil-military perspec-
tive, Brazil's reservation toward the IAIiA inspection system is, in fact, consistent 
with the military's known secrecy and lack of transparency. If Brazil were to de-
velop a nuclear program with military assistance, then such a decision would 
cast doubt as to the strength of regional and globa l nonproliferation norms, 
which arguably dissuade states from considering the nuclear option. 
The Brazilian Constitution and the international obligations wi thin the NPT 
and T1atelolco legally forbid Brazil from acquiring a nuclear weapon, although 
these legal obligations have not silenced those who believe the country should 
develop a nuclear device. A coalition wi th in the military and defense establish-
ments remained skeptica l about Brazil's accession to the nonproliferation re-
gime. For example, in 2009, Vice President Jose Alencar publically declared that 
nuclear weapons wou ld be a boon to the security of Brazil. Alencar, who was a 
former minister of defense, declared: ~The nuclear weapon, used as an instru-
ment of deterrence, is of great importance for a country that has 15,000 kilome-
ters of border to the west and a territorial sea that contains oil reserves."" This 
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was a shocking declaration coming from one of Brazil's highest public authori-
ties. The presidential spokesman qUickly dismissed Alencar's comments, which 
he argued "did not reflect the position of the government''''' Still, the vice presi-
dent's statements raised questions about why a peaceful country, surrounded by 
mostly friendly countries, would require a nuclear bomb for deterrence. Once 
again, the predominant view among some military strategists is that Brazil con-
ceded too much when it joined the NPT and Tlatelolco. Reversing the decision 
to become nuclear is thus suggested as a means of recovering bargaining lever-
age and power status. On the other hand, environmental groups, scholars, dip-
lomats, and some scientists (not m ilitary scientists) consider that such a move is 
fundamentally fl awed because it could destabilize the region and harm Brazil's 
national interests. As global public policy expert Oliver Stuenkel argues, "Bra-
zil could conceivably use its status as the only BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China) member without nuclear weapons to playa leading role in the quest for 
global disarmament''' ' 
Ultimately, this means that nuclear analysts need to pay close attention to 
Brazil's domestic politics, specifically to civil-military relations. Brazil has been 
able to achieve substantial gains in terms of democratic consolidation (especially 
during the Cardoso administration), but institutional civilian control remains 
inherently weak. The Ministry of Defense operates mostly as an administra-
tive agency, with little impact on strategy and doctrine; congressional oversight 
of the armed forces is notoriously low; and the armed forces continue to oper-
ate with a degree of institutional autonomy."' \Vhile the military is no longer in 
power, it continues to exercise influence over securi ty and nuclear issues. 
This leads us to the third and final question: \Vhich is the ideal country to 
help reinvigorate nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation discussions in the 
region? For decades, the leading Latin American partner was Mexico. the coun-
try that had chosen nuclear restra int and whose embrace of disarmament initia-
tives helped propel global and regional nonproliferation norms. If anything. the 
nonproliferation regime requires more than just solid norms and principles to 
work; it also needs norm entrepreneurs and leadership. As Australian National 
University expert Maria Rost Rublee argues, nuclear threshold states that have 
chosen restraint playa significant role in this regard. Their commitment to a 
nonnuclear status provides "a moral stance against nuclear weapons.," leading to 
an energetic support of global d isarmament'''' 
Yet, Mexico's support for the nonproliferation regime is slowly eroding. in 
part due to domestic politics and u.s. influence. This too can undermine both 
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regional and global disarmament efforts. Two dynamics are in operation in 
Mexico. First, the traditional role of the armed forces is being revised because 
of the government's offensive launch against drug cartels. Increasingly, internal 
security has become the main issue of concern, with nuclear proliferation occu-
pying a secondary ro le. Recent survey polls conducted by one of Mexico City's 
leading public research institutes show that Mexicans feel threatened by drug 
trafficking and organized crime, global warming, AIDS, food shortages, and the 
globa l economic crisis, in that order.8<In a country that has just recently democ-
ratized, politicians and diplomats alike feel compelled to follow their constitu-
ents' wishes. In this context, the armed forces are being asked to perform po-
licing missions, thus occupying a more active and present role in politics than 
in the past. Not surprisingly, Mexico's diplomatic corps pays increasing inter-
est to promoting and establishing an international regime for small weapons 
and gun control, which, ironically, is inspired by the nonproliferation regime. 
At the same time, the shadow of the Cuban Missile Crisis has vanished, as few 
Mexicans seem to remember the negative consequences of nuclear prolifera-
tion. Mexicds unconditional support for the nonproliferation regime is thus 
in question. 
The second dynamic is directly linked to Mexicds close relationship with 
\Vashington. Since the early 1990S, there has been a tendency toward bilater-
alism, in which the U.S. role in Mexican politics increased at the expense of 
multilateralism. Mexico's economic and trade policy relies heavily on the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NA H A), since more than 86 percent of its ex-
ports go to the United States and Canada. '" '''ith more than 70 percent of its GDP 
derived from trade, Mexico's bilateral relationship with Washington has a pre-
dominance that no other issue occupies in the Mexican foreign policy agenda. 
There is no doubt that NAFTA has made Mexico and \Vashington close partners. 
This is evident in Mexico's voting behavior in the UN General Assembly, as well 
as in NPT review conferences, especially since 1995, when Mexico flatly sided 
with Washington after decades of opposition."" The strong bilateral policy has af-
fected the country's policy in the regime itself. Personnel, resources, money, and 
infras tructure go to fund bilateral initiatives, including consulates and support 
for Mexican communities in the United States. W ith limited diplomatic ties in 
Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, Mexico is at a dear disadvantage to negotiate 
with members of the General Assembly, the Group of 77, and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (made up mostly of African and Asian states), all of which are in-
fluential in the nonproliferation regime. In other words, the bilateralization of 
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Mexico's foreign policy has undermined its tradit ional leading role in the multi-
lateral nonproliferation regime. 
The findings in this chapter lead to a number of policy prescriptions. Lessons 
drawn from Latin America suggest that efforts should perhaps be made to pro-
mote stable civi l-military relations in countries with nuclear energy programs by 
strengthening civilian control of them. Interestingly enough, few civil-military 
relations promotion programs have an interest in nuclear policy issues. They 
focus instead on parliamentary control, defense spending reduction, and mili-
tary effectiveness. Perhaps it is time for the United States to shift its attention 
away from sanctions and nuclear carrots and toward consolidating civilian con-
trol of nuclear energy programs. 
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